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In this paper, we analyze how the introduction of aspirations and habits aﬀects
the distribution of wealth. When aspirations are present the utility of individuals
depends on the consumption experience of their parents, while under habits the utility
associated with a given amount of current consumption depends on the past experience
of consumption of the individual under consideration. In both cases, past consumption
is used as a reference with respect to which current consumption is compared and this
implies that preferences turn out to be time non-separable.
A large number of empirical studies provide evidence about the eﬀect of the level
of past consumption on the satisfaction derived from current consumption. According
to this evidence, some authors have used preferences displaying habit formation to
improve the predictions made under time separable preferences in diﬀerent economic
scenarios.1 Moreover, there is also empirical evidence about the existence of aspirations
associated with the involuntary transmission of tastes from one generation to the next.
For instance, Cox et al. (2004) estimate that parental preferences explain between 5
to 10 percent of the preferences of their children after controlling for their respective
incomes.2
Our analysis will be conducted in the framework of an overlapping generations
(OLG) economy where preferences of individuals display "joy of giving". This means
that individuals’ utility will be an increasing function of the amount of bequest left
to their children, like in Yaari (1965) and Abel (1986). Several alternative motives
leading to intergenerational transfers have been proposed in the literature. Among
them, and besides to joy of giving, we could mention strategic behavior (Bernheim et al.,
1985), existence of incomplete annuity markets (Abel, 1985), and pure intergenerational
altruism (Barro, 1974). However, the empirical evidence is not conclusive about the
reasons why individuals make intergenerational transfers and probably a combination
of all those motives lies in the core of the mechanism governing the intergenerational
transmission of wealth.
When individuals care about the total income of their children, bequests play an
equalizing role since then individuals tend to compensate the diﬀerences in the random
income of their direct descendants. This compensation principle has been used to
argue against taxes on inheritances since they could have a disequalizing eﬀect due to
the distortion of the optimal risk sharing between two consecutive generations (Becker
and Tomes, 1979; and Davies, 1986). In our framework with joy-of-giving preferences,
this compensation principle does not come into play since individuals do not seek an
optimal allocation of family income between them and their children but an optimal
allocation of individual income between own consumption and bequests. Kleiber et al.
(2006) have shown that under joy-of-giving preferences, the introduction of bequests
results in a reduction of the value of the coeﬃcient of intragenerational variation of
1See, among others, Abel (1990, 1999), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Carroll et al. (1997, 2000) and
Alonso-Carrera et al. (2004, 2005).
2Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) provide surveys about
the evidence on intergenerational transmission of tastes. Among the theoretical studies on the
macroeconomic implications of aspirations, we could mention those of de la Croix (1996, 2001), de
la Croix and Michel (1999, 2001), and Alonso-Carrera et. al (2007).
1wealth. This is so because the average stock of capital becomes larger due to the
increase of saving induced by the bequest motive, which oﬀsets the modest increase
in the variance of wealth associated with the intergenerational transmission of income
shocks through bequests.
Our framework will be also suitable for the study of intergenerational mobility,
which is characterized by the correlation between the wealth of parents and their
children. Obviously, the introduction of bequests has a negative eﬀect on mobility
since they allow the intergenerational transmission of the wealth status.
We will show that habits and aspirations aﬀect both the size of aggregate bequests
and the level of the capital stock installed in the economy in a direction similar to the
one obtained by de la Croix and Michel (2001), Jellal and Wolﬀ (2002) and Alonso-
Carrera et al. (2007), who conducted the analysis under the assumption of altruistic
preferences à la Barro (1974). Using the coeﬃcient of variation of wealth as a measure
of intragenerational wealth inequality, we also show that the introduction of aspirations
increases the intragenerational inequality of wealth since aspirations make the shocks
in labor income more persistent. Aspirations make an individual’s adult consumption
(and his saving) more dependent on his ancestors’ income shocks, which results in a
transmission of those shocks within the same dynasty. However, the introduction of
habits decreases the intragenerational inequality of wealth when aspirations are present.
This is so because habits tend to smooth consumption along the individuals’ lifetime.
Therefore, the old consumption (and saving) of an individual becomes less dependent
on the shocks suﬀered by his parents.
We also evaluate the eﬀects of habits and aspirations on intergenerational mobility.
We measure this mobility by the autocorrelation coeﬃcient of asset holdings within
a family. We show that, due to the induced reduction in the amount of bequests,
aspirations tend to enhance intergenerational mobility. However, habits make saving
more correlated with contemporaneous wages and this translates in turn in a larger
dependence of inheritances on wages. The ﬁnal result is that habits reduce the
stationary wealth mobility of the economy.
It is also natural to perform some evaluation of the eﬀects of social security
in the economy under consideration. Note that social security is a compulsory
intergenerational redistributive mechanism that works in a direction opposite to
bequests as it forces a transmission of income from young to old individuals. Abel
(1985) analyzed the impact of a funded social security system in a setup where the
inequality in the distribution of wealth appears as a result of random mortality so that
the diﬀerent mortality histories of families give raise to a non-degenerate distribution
of accidental bequests. Cremer and Pestieau (1988) conducted a similar analysis in
the presence of fertility shocks. Finally, Caballé and Fuster (2003) analyzed the eﬀects
of an unfunded social security system under random altruism where the amount of
inheritance received by each individual depends on the realization of an idiosyncratic
shock on the altruism factor of parents.
The standard result that social security reduces the aggregate stock of capital also
holds in our model. However, we will analyze whether this negative eﬀect becomes
stronger or weaker in the presence of habits and aspirations. Our results show that these
two phenomena work in opposite directions concerning the eﬃcacy of social security
and, moreover, the sign of the eﬀect depends on the dynamic eﬃciency properties
2of the economy. We perform a similar comparative statics analysis concerning the
eﬀects of social security on the coeﬃcient of intragenerational variation of wealth to
conclude that, while social security has an equalizing eﬀect, this eﬀect becomes smaller
when preferences display either aspirations or habits. Finally, we also analyze the
interactions among social security, habits and aspirations concerning their implications
for intergenerational mobility in wealth.
Our results in a OLG economy with preferences displaying ‘joy of giving’ diﬀer in
many respects with the ones of the related paper by Díaz et al. (2003), who considered
an economy with inﬁnitely lived agents. In order to make a proper comparison,
we should consider the version of their model where the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is not adjusted when habits are introduced. First, our model allows us
to introduce the phenomenon of intergenerational transmission of tastes, which cannot
be accommodated in non-OLG economies. Furthermore, our economic environment is
well suited to conduct an analysis of the eﬀects of social security. Finally, our simple
model allows us to obtain closed form expression for the comparative statics exercises
when aspirations and habits are marginally introduced. Concerning the results, while
Díaz et al. do not obtain a deﬁnite sign for the change in aggregate saving when habits
are introduced, our life-cycle speciﬁcation allows to obtain an unambiguous increase in
aggregate saving due to the induced shift of income from the adult to the old period of
life. Finally, our demographic structure allows a sharp characterization of the eﬀects
of habits on intergenerational mobility within a family.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general model with
habits, aspirations, and pay-as-you-go social security. Section 3 analyzes some
dynamic stability issues of the intragenerational distribution of wealth. In Section
4, we characterize the measure of intergenerational mobility in wealth. In Section
5, we conduct the comparative statics analysis of changes in the intensity of habits
and aspirations on the stationary intragenerational distribution of wealth and on
intergenerational mobility. In Section 6 we analyze how the size of social security
aﬀects the intragenerational distribution of wealth and the stationary mobility under
time non-separable preferences. We conclude the paper in Section 7.
2. The Model
Let us consider an OLG economy where a continuum of individuals live for three periods
a n dan e wg e n e r a t i o ni sb o r ni ne a c hp e r i o d .E a c hi n d i v i d u a lh a so ﬀspring in the second
period of his life and the exogenous number of children per parent is n ≥ 1.A g e n t s
make economic decisions during the last two periods of their lives only.
There is a single commodity, which can be devoted to either consumption or
investment. Each agent inelastically supplies one unit of labor in the second period
of his life and is retired in the third period. Let us index each generation by the
period in which its members work. Therefore, if the size of the generation t is Nt,
then Nt+1 = nNt for all t. There is also a social security system that collects payroll
taxes from the workers (adult individuals) and distributes a beneﬁt to the retired (old)
individuals in a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis.
An adult individual i ∈ [0,N t] of generation t distributes his net labor income and
his inheritance between consumption and saving. The budget constraint faced by the







t is the wage compensation of this worker, ci
t is the amount of his consumption
(adult consumption, henceforth), bi
t is the amount of inheritance he has received from
his parent, si
t is the amount of saving and τ ∈ [0,1) is the social security tax rate.
When individuals are old, they receive a social security beneﬁt and a return
from their savings, which are distributed between consumption and bequests for their







where Rt+1 is the gross rate of return on saving, pi
t+1 is the social security beneﬁth ew i l l
receive when old, bi
t+1 is the amount of bequests he leaves to each of his descendants
(who where born in period t),a n dxi
t+1 is the amount of consumption of the old
individual i in period t +1(old consumption, henceforth).
We will assume that in each period individuals derive utility from the comparison of
their consumption with a consumption reference. Recall that during their ﬁrst period
of life individuals neither work nor consume. However, as in de la Croix (1996), the
member i of the generation born in period t − 1 inherits a certain level of aspirations
ai
t in period t. These aspirations are based on the standard of living achieved by their






t−1 is his parent’s amount of consumption when the parent was adult (second
period of life). We posit the following additive speciﬁcation for the aspiration adjusted
consumption ˆ ci





This additive formulation for aspiration adjusted consumption makes it possible to
preserve the concavity of the objective function with respect to the consumption vector.
Preferences will also exhibit habit formation and, hence, the consumption reference
of an old individual i of generation t is given by the consumption level he has reached
in the previous period. As we have done for aspirations, we assume that the habit
adjusted consumption ˆ xi






For tractability we posit the following Cobb-Douglas utility function representing








where α, β and ρ are strictly positive and, without loss of generality, we assume that
α + β + ρ =1. Note that we are generating positive bequests through a "joy-of-giving"
motivation (like in Yaari, 1965; or Abel, 1986) so that the amount of bequests enters
directly as an argument in the utility function.
4We assume that the good of this economy is produced by means of the aggregate
linear production function F(Kt,L t)=Lt + rKt, where Lt i st h ea m o u n to fe ﬃcient
u n i t so fl a b o ru s e di np e r i o dt and Kt is the amount of installed capital. Labor and
capital markets are competitive so that the marginal productivity of an eﬃcient unit
of labor is equal to one and then the wage wi
t can be interpreted as the realization
of the random number of eﬃciency units of labor owned by worker i in period t. We
assume that the number of eﬃcient units of labor, and thus the wage wi
t received by
the worker i of generation t, is the realization of a random variable that is identically
and independently distributed (i.i.d.) with mean w and variance V , for all i and
t. Therefore, we are assuming that all workers experience idiosyncratic productivity
shocks that are cross-sectionally and intergenerationally independent. These shocks on
labor income are assumed to be uninsurable. The equilibrium rental price of one unit
of capital is r so that the gross rate of return on savings satisﬁes Rt+1 =1+r ≡ R.3
We will assume that the social security beneﬁt received by an old agent is




where π is a positive constant. Moreover, the budget constraint of the PAYG social








tdj, for all t,










Applying the law of large numbers for a continuum of i.i.d random variables, the
previous equation simpliﬁes to πτw = nτw so that π = n. Therefore, we see from




t, for all t, (2.8)
so that retired individuals receive their previous contribution adjusted by the gross rate
of population growth.




t} subject to (2.1), (2.2),




t and Rt+1. If we plug the social security
budget constraint (2.8), the aspiration formation equation (2.3), and the competitive
gross rate of return Rt+1 = R into the solution of this individual problem, we ﬁnd the














t + δ (β + ρ)ci
t−1, (2.9)
3The assumption of constant rental prices for labor and capital could also be the result of considering
a small open economy with perfect capital mobility and no labor mobility. This means that the interest
rate is constant and equal to its international level. Under a standard neoclassical production function
and competitive input markets, the equilibrium capital-labor ratio turns out to be constant and, thus,



















































t − δ (β + ρ)ci
t−1. (2.12)
Clearly, optimal consumption, bequests and saving of the individual i depend on the
realization of his productivity shock wi
t, on the amount of inheritance bi
t he has received
and, ﬁnally, on his aspiration level, which equals the adult consumption of his parents
ci
t−1. Note also that all the previous variables depend positively on wi
t and bi
t.H o w e v e r ,
while adult consumption is increasing in the parents consumption ci
t−1 due to the eﬀect
of aspirations, old consumption, saving, and bequests are all decreasing in ci
t−1.
3. The Dynamics of Consumption, Wealth, and Bequests
The dynamics of the economy is entirely driven by the autonomous system of stochastic
diﬀerence equations formed by (2.9) and (2.11). To analyze the aggregate behavior
of the economy we should obtain the aggregate levels per capita of the endogenous
variables. To this end, we can use the law of large numbers to compute the mean
values of adult consumption and bequest within a generation by just computing the






¯ bt +( β + ρ)δ¯ ct−1 +















[(1 − τ)R + nτ]ρw
n
, (3.2)
where ¯ ct and ¯ bt are the average amounts of adult consumption and bequest in period
t, respectively.
We could also analyze the dynamics of the second moments of the endogenous



















































































In order to close the system referred to the dynamics of the second-order moments, we






between the amount of adult consumption
and the amount of bequest left to each of his descendants by the generic individual i.


































































coincide with the empirical intragenerational variances Va r(ct),V a r (xt),
Va r(st) and Va r(bt) of the distribution of adult consumption, old consumption, saving






coincides with the empirical covariance
Cov(ct,b t+1) between adult consumption and bequest left to each descendant.
The steady state value of average adult consumption and bequests is given by
¯ c =
αn[(1 − τ)R + nτ]w




ρ(1 − δ)[(1− τ)R + nτ]w
n[1 − δ (β + ρ)] − ρR(1 − δ)
, (3.7)
where the previous steady state values are obtained by just making ¯ ct =¯ ct−1 =¯ c and
¯ bt+1 = ¯ bt+1 = ¯ b in equations (3.1) and (3.2) and then solving for ¯ c and ¯ b.M o r e o v e r ,
taking expectations in both sides of (2.12) and evaluating the resulting equation at the
stationary distribution, we obtain the average saving per capita:
¯ s =
[(β (1 − τ)+ρ)(R + γ)(1− δ) − α(nτ − (1 − τ)γ)]nw
[n(1 − δ(β + ρ)) − ρR(1 − δ)](R + γ)
. (3.8)
Similarly, using equations (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5), we can compute the empirical
variances of consumption and bequests, Va r(c) and Va r(b), and the corresponding
stationary covariance Cov(c,b0) between adult consumption c and bequest b0 left to



































We next proceed to ﬁnd the conditions under which the ﬁrst and second moments
of the joint distribution of the endogenous variables of our model converge to their
steady state values. To analyze the stability of the dynamic system formed by the
equations (3.1) and (3.2) determining the evolution of the means of adult consumption






































The following lemma provides a suﬃcient condition for the dynamic stability of the
ﬁrst moments of the intragenerational distribution of adult consumption and bequest:
Lemma 3.1. If
ρR
n < 1 and the aspirations intensity δ is suﬃciently small, then the
dynamic system formed by equations (3.1) and (3.2) converges monotonically to the
steady state for average adult consumption and average bequest given by (3.6) and
(3.7), respectively.







(β + ρ)δn+ ρR
n
> 0.
The corresponding characteristic polynomial is
Q(λ) ≡ λ2 −
∙







so that the values λ1 and λ2 solving the equation Q(λ)=0are the eigenvalues of the
coeﬃcient matrix P. The discriminant ∆(δ) of the quadratic equation Q(λ)=0is
∆(δ)=
[(β + ρ)δn+ ρR]
2 − 4ρδRn
n2 .











Let us assume for the rest of the proof that δ lies on that interval so that the two
eigenvalues are real. We know that λ1 + λ2 = Tr(P) > 0 and λ1λ2 = Det(P) > 0.
Therefore, as the two eigenvalues are real, their sign must be positive. Moreover, if
δ tends to zero, the two eigenvalues converge to zero and
ρR
n ∈ (0,1), respectively,





λ. As the eigenvalues are continuous
functions of the parameter δ representing the aspiration intensity, we conclude that, for
as u ﬃciently small value of the parameter δ, both eigenvalues are real, positive, and
smaller than 1, which proves the desired monotone convergence property.
Concerning the stability of the dynamic system driving the evolution of second
order moments formed by equations (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5), we can proceed in a similar
fashion. Note that we can rewrite that system in matrix form,
⎛








































⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
,
where the coeﬃcient matrix W is given by
W =
⎛



























⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
.
The following lemma provides a suﬃcient condition for dynamic stability of the second
moments of the intragenerational distribution of consumption and bequest:
Lemma 3.2. If
ρR
n < 1 and the aspirations intensity δ is suﬃciently small, then the
dynamic system formed by equations (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) converges to the steady state
for the variance of adult consumption, variance of bequest, and covariance between
adult consumption and the amount of bequest left to each descendant given by (3.9),
(3.10), and (3.11), respectively.









+ fˆ λ − gˆ λ, (3.16)
9with
d =






















If δ approaches zero, then the three eigenvalues of the coeﬃcient matrix W tend





∈ (0,1), ˆ λ2 =0 , and ˆ λ3 =0since the coeﬃcient d of the





, while the coeﬃcients f and g tend to









since the eigenvalues are continuous functions of the parameter δ, it follows that the
three eigenvalues will lie in the interior of the unit circle for a suﬃciently small value
of δ.
For the rest of the paper, we will maintain the assumption ρR/n < 1, which together
with a suﬃciently small value of the parameter δ, ensures the monotonic convergence
of ﬁrst and second moments of the intragenerational distribution of adult consumption
and bequests.
4. Intergenerational Mobility
To perform an analysis of intergenerational mobility in our economy we should analyze





between the amount of assets held by two members of the same family belonging to
two consecutive generations. With no bequests and no aspirations this autocorrelation
would be equal to zero, so that we would obtain perfect mobility as wages are i.i.d. If we
had perfect correlation of asset holdings, i.e. Corr(si
t+1,s i
t)=1 , then intergenerational
mobility would be null.
It is important to point out that, even if altruism is absent, the presence of
aspirations induces a wealth correlation across the members of consecutive generations
within the same family. This is so because aspirations induce a correlation between
the amount of parents’ consumption and the proﬁle of consumption and saving of their
descendants.





















where s0 denotes the saving of an individual of the next generation belonging to the
same family. The expression (3.12) gives us Va r(s) so that we only need to compute
the intergenerational covariance of wealth, Cov(s0,s), in the previous formula. To this
10end, we ﬁrst observe that the policy functions (2.9), (2.11), and (2.12) become at the
stationary distribution:
ct = Awt + Bbt + Cct−1,
bt+1 = Dwt + Ebt + Fct−1,
and
st = Gwt + Hbt + Ict−1, (4.1)
where
A =





,C = δ (β + ρ),
D =














γ + R(β + ρ)
R + γ
, and I = −δ (β + ρ).
Then, we compute
st+1 = Gwt+1 + Hbt+1 + Ict
= Gwt+1 + H(Dwt + Ebt + Fct−1)
| {z }
bt+1
+ I(Awt + Bbt + Cct−1)
| {z }
ct
= Gwt+1 +( H · D + I · A)wt +( H · E + I · B)bt +( H · F + I · C)c1
t−1
= Gwt+1 + Jwt + Mbt + Nc1
t−1, (4.2)
where
J = H · D + I · A, M = H · E + I · B, and N = H · F + I · C.
Therefore, combining (4.1) and (4.2), we get
Cov(st+1,s t)=Cov(s0,s)=G · J · Va r(w)+H · M · Va r(b)
+I · M · Cov
¡
c,b0¢
+ H · N · Cov
¡
c,b0¢
+ I · N · Va r(c)




Since the stationary values of Va r(c), Va r(b), and Cov(c,b0) are given by (3.9), (3.10),
and (3.11), respectively, we can plug them into (4.3) to ﬁnd an explicit expressions for
Cov(s0,s). In the next two sections we will conduct the corresponding comparative
statics exercise on the stationary value of the autocorrelation coeﬃcient Corr(s0,s)
to characterize the eﬀects on the level of intergenerational mobility of changes in the
intensity of habits and aspirations and to evaluate also the eﬀects of a PAYG social
security system on mobility.
115. Eﬀects of Habits and Aspirations on the Intragenenrational Distri-
bution of Wealth and Intergenerational Mobility.
In this section, we will ﬁrst characterize the eﬀect of habits and aspirations on the
stationary intragenerational distribution of wealth. Note that those properties of
individual preferences aﬀect the amount of saving since they modify the evaluation
of the utility derived from consumption in the two periods of life. Moreover, the
distribution of saving is equivalent to the intragenerational distribution of the
individuals’ asset holdings at the beginning of their last period of life.
By diﬀerentiating (3.8) and (3.7) with respect to the parameters δ and γ measuring
the intensity of aspirations and habits, respectively, we get the following eﬀects on the




((1 − τ)R + nτ)(n(β + ρ)+ργ)nαw
[n[1 − δ(β + ρ)] − ρR(1 − δ)]





((1 − τ)R + nτ)nαw





αρn((1 − τ)R + nτ)w
[n[1 − δ (β + ρ)] − ρR(1 − δ)]





The multiplier∂¯ s/∂γ is positive since its denominator is positive. To see this, observe
that
n[1 − δ (β + ρ)] − ρR(1 − δ)=n[1 − δ (1 − α)] − ρR(1 − δ)
>n (1 − δ) − ρR(1 − δ)=( n − ρR)(1− δ) > 0. (5.3)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the fact that α + β + ρ =1 , the ﬁrst inequality
follows as α ∈ (0,1) and, ﬁnally, the last inequality is a consequence of the dynamic
stability assumption, ρR/n < 1.
An increase in the value of the aspiration intensity δ increases the marginal utility
of an extra unit of adult consumption since individuals are more sensitive to the level of
consumption of their parent when evaluating their own adult consumption. Therefore,
individuals optimally increase their adult consumption and, thus, the amounts of both
saving and inheritance received by their children should go down. Concerning the
eﬀect of an increase in the value of the habit formation parameter γ,w en o t i c et h a t
individuals experience an increase in the marginal valuation of their old consumption
as they internalize with more intensity their past adult consumption and, thus, they
optimally decide to shift consumption from the adult to the old age. On the one hand,
the reduction of adult consumption lowers the amount of accumulated habits and, on
the other hand, the increase in old consumption is the optimal response to the increase
in the marginal utility of old consumption. We also see that the aggregate eﬀects of
stronger habits are accommodated along the life cycle of individuals since the aggregate
amount of bequests remains unchanged (see equation (5.2)).
12We could also analyze how the changes in the values of the parameters δ and γ
aﬀect the intragenerational variability of wealth. We will concentrate our analysis on
the variability of saving, which fully determines the amount of assets held by individuals
at the beginning of the last period of their lives. Since the average amount of saving
is also aﬀected by those changes, it seems appropriate to perform our comparative
statics exercise on the coeﬃcient of variation, CV(s)=( Va r(s))
1/2 /¯ s. Using (3.8),









3/2 (n − Rρ)
1/2 w
> 0,
where the sign of the previous derivative follows immediately under our maintained
condition of dynamic stability, ρR/n < 1. Our comparative statics exercise on the
coeﬃcient of variation of saving is conducted in a quite restrictive scenario, which
allows us to unambiguously sign the eﬀects of stronger aspirations. We do evaluate
the derivative of CV(s) with respect to δ at the point δ = γ = τ =0 , that is, we
analyze the eﬀect of the marginal introduction of aspirations in an economy when both
social security and habits are absent or are present at a small scale. The evaluation
of the previous derivative for arbitrary values of δ, γ and τ c a n n o tb ee x p l i c i t l y
signed. We then see that the marginal introduction of aspirations increases the
variability of wealth. As individuals take into account their parents’ past consumption
experience, there is now a new channel through which the the shocks on wages propagate
intergenerationally, which results in a large intragenerational variation of wealth.
In order to evaluate the robustness of the sign of the previous derivative, we conduct
a numerical analysis. We choose the values of the preference parameters α =1 /2,
β =1 /4, and ρ =1 /4. Moreover, following Iacoviello (2007), we chose the value of the
average wage w =2 /3 and make the cross-sectional standard deviation of the log of










=0 .13637, which amounts to a variation coeﬃcient of
wages equal to V 1/2/w =0 .55392. We assume constant population, n =1 . Finally,
we choose an interest rate per year of 4% and we consider that each period last for
30 years so that R =( 1 .04)
30 =3 .2434. We maintain these parameter values for the
remaining numerical exercises unless otherwise speciﬁed. In Figure 1, we see that the
positive eﬀect of aspirations on the coeﬃcient of variation of asset holdings is preserved
for all the values of δ and for diﬀerent combinations of values for the habit parameter
(γ =0and γ =1 /4) and the social security tax (τ =0and τ =1 /3).N o t e t h a t w e
restrict the domain of the aspiration parameter δ to lie in the interval (3.15) so that
δ ∈ [0,0.27824).
[Insert Figure 1]
Concerning the implications for the intragenerational variability of wealth of changes
in habit intensity, it can be shown that
∂CV (s)
∂γ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
δ=0
=0 .
Therefore, we see that habits aﬀect the level of intragenerational variation of wealth
only if aspirations are present. This means that changes in the habit intensity aﬀect
13the intergenerational transmission of productivity shocks only through the inherited
tastes. Moreover, we can compute the following derivative:
∂CV (s)
∂γ








where its negative sign follows again under the assumption ρR/n < 1. Note also that
the previous derivative (5.4) g i v e su st h ee ﬀect on the variability of asset holdings of the
introduction of habits when the value of the social security tax is around zero. Clearly,
when habits are introduced, a shock on wages is more evenly distributed among adult
and old consumption since habits enhance consumption smoothing along the life cycle.
Therefore, habits make an individual’s adult consumption less sensitive to wage shocks
and this induces in turn less volatility in the consumption and saving of his descendants.
In Figure 2, we see that the negative sign of the derivative (5.4) is preserved for strictly
positive values of the habit parameter γ and for diﬀerent values of the social security
tax τ.In the the two graphs we set the value of the aspiration parameter at the strictly
positive value δ =1 /5. We have also checked the robustness of the sign of the derivative
for diﬀerent values of the aspiration intensity δ in the interval [0,0.27824).
[Insert Figure 2]
We can proceed now with the analysis of the eﬀects of habit and aspiration
intensities γ and δ on the level of intergenerational mobility within a family, which is
characterized by the correlation of asset holdings at the stationary distribution. To this
end we need to compute the derivatives of the stationary value of the autocorrelation
coeﬃcient Corr(s0,s) obtained in Section 4 with respect to the parameters representing









n2 +2 ρ2R2 (R − 1)
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1+δ2 (1 − 2β)
¤2 βR
> 0. (5.6)
Again these derivatives characterize the eﬀects of the marginal introduction of either
aspirations and habits when the size of the social security system is small. Moreover, the
derivative of the correlation coeﬃcient Corr(s0,s) with respect to the habits parameter
γ c a no n l yb ee x p l i c i t l ys i g n e dw h e nt h ed e g r ee of altruism, which is parametrized by
ρ, is suﬃciently low. Note that, if we evaluate the derivative (5.6) when there are no
aspirations, we clearly obtain
∂Corr(s0,s)
∂γ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
δ=γ=τ=0
=0
14so that, again, changes in habits only aﬀect the level of intragenerational mobility
through the transmission of tastes across the generations within the same family.
We see thus that the introduction of aspirations and habits have opposite eﬀects on
intergenerational mobility. On the one hand, the introduction of aspirations raises
the degree of mobility. As the marginal utility of adult consumption increases when
aspirations are introduced ceteris paribus, workers tend to increase their consumption
by both reducing their saving and, thus, by reducing the amount of bequests they plan
to leave to their children. Obviously, this results in a smaller correlation between the
assets of the members of the same family belonging to two consecutive generations.
On the other hand, when habits are introduced, workers wish to smooth more their
consumption along the life cycle. Hence, a positive shock in their labor income
results in a larger increase in their saving aimed at shifting adult consumption towards
old consumption. In the presence of aspirations, consumption and saving levels of
individuals belonging to consecutive generations become correlated and this correlation
becomes indeed larger as the saving of each individual becomes more sensitive to
productivity shocks. We see then that the introduction of habits results in an increase
in the correlation of wealth between members of consecutive generations within the
same dynasty.
In Figures 3 and 4 we conduct a numerical analysis to check the robustness of the
signs of the derivatives (5.5) and (5.6). When aspirations are present in an economy with
no habits, no altruism, and no social security, the autocorrelation coeﬃcient of asset
holdings is negative. Obviously, since adult individuals want to mimic the consumption
level of their parents and labor income is uncorrelated across generations, the saving of
two consecutive generations of the same family becomes negatively correlated. When
the aspiration intensity increases, individuals raise their adult consumption in response
to the larger parental consumption by reducing their saving. This negative eﬀect of
aspirations on asset autocorrelation is preserved through the numerical examples of
Figure 3 with δ ∈ [0,0.27824) and ρ =1 /4. Note that, since we have introduced altruism
in these examples, bequests are positive and, hence, the autocorrelation Corr(s,s0)
becomes positive as a consequence of the intergenerational transmission of wealth.
[Insert Figure 3]
In Figure 4 we make again the value of the aspiration parameter equal to δ =1 /5.
Moreover, in that ﬁgure we consider two values for the altruism parameter, ρ =0and
ρ =1 /4. When there is no altruism, ρ =0 , we see in the ﬁrst two panels of Figure 4 that
the autocorrelation of asset holding is negative due to the presence of aspirations. Both
for τ =0and τ =1 /3 the relationship between the autocorrelation Corr(s,s0) and the
value of the habit parameter γ is positive, which agrees with (5.6). In the last two panels
of Figure 4 we consider the case with ρ =1 /4 and, then, the wealth autocorrelation
becomes positive due to the introduction of altruism and the corresponding positive
bequests. Here, the positive relationship between Corr(s,s0) and the intensity of habits
is not preserved since the corresponding graph is inverted U-shaped. We see from (2.11)
that when ρ>0 the amount of bequests decreases with the habit intensity γ. This
is so because individuals want to shift more resources towards old consumption and
they achieve this goal by reducing the amounts of adult consumption (see (2.9)) and
bequests. Therefore, this reduction in the level of intergenerational transfers ends up
15oﬀsetting the initial positive eﬀect on Corr(s,s0) of habits.
[Insert Figure 4]
6. The Eﬀects of Social Security
In this economy the eﬀect of raising the social security tax, and thus the social security
beneﬁts, results in a reduction of aggregate saving. This is a standard result accruing
from the transfer of income from the second period of life to the third one brought about
by the social security system. Individuals oﬀset this compulsory transfer by lowering




[(1 − δ)β (R + γ)+α(n + γ)]nw
[n(1 − δ (β + ρ)) − ρR(1 − δ)](R + γ)
< 0.
The eﬀect of social security on bequests depends on whether the economy is dynamically
eﬃcient (i.e., R>n ) or ineﬃcient (i.e., R<n ) in the steady state according to the
dynamically optimality criterion of Cass (1979). Since the return of the PAYG social
security system is equal to the gross rate of population growth n, if R>nthen
an increase in the social security tax shifts resources from the productive investment
earning the gross rate R to the social security system, which yields a lower return
n. This implies that the present value of individuals’ lifetime income decreases and,
therefore, these poorer individuals end up leaving a lower amount of bequest to their
descendants. The converse argument applies when R<n .The previous discussion is




ρ(1 − δ)(n − R)w
n[1 − δ (β + ρ)] − ρR(1 − δ)
,
which is positive (negative) when R<(>)n as follows from (5.3).
Concerning the eﬀects of social security on the variability of wealth, we obtain the









n(β + ρ)(n + Rρ)
1/2 w
< 0.
Note that the previous derivative is evaluated at the point δ = γ = τ =0so that
we are characterizing the eﬀect on wealth variability of introducing a PAYG social
security system when habits and aspirations are not very important. The coeﬃcient of
variation of asset holdings decreases when the social security tax is introduced. This
is so because the equalizing impact of the introduction of the proportional payroll
tax on adult income is translated into a lower variability of adult consumption and
s a v i n g .F i g u r e5s h o w sh o wt h en e g a t i v es i g n of the previous derivative is maintained
for diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the parameter values of aspiration and habit intensity
when the social security tax τ is not too large. However, when the tax rate is large
(above 60% in our simulations), the relationship between variability of wealth and the
tax rate becomes negative. When the social tax rate is so large the average amount of
saving becomes negative since individuals want to transfer income from their third to
16their second period of life. The variability of this negative saving will be now driven
by the variability of the income that individuals receive when they are old. Obviously,
the variability of the third period income is linked to the variability of social security
beneﬁts, which rises with the tax rate τ.
[Insert Figure 5]
Since aspirations and habits aﬀect the intragenerational distribution of wealth, we
could also analyze how these two phenomena aﬀect the eﬃcacy of social security. This
analysis will allows us to see whether habits and expectations exacerbate or not the
eﬀects of social security on the intragenerational distribution of wealth. Therefore, we




(n(β + ρ)+ργ)α(R − n)nw
(R + γ)[n(1 − (β + ρ)δ) − ρR(1 − δ)]
2,





[n(1 − (β + ρ)δ) − ρR(1 − δ)](R + γ)
2,
which is positive (negative) when R<(>)n. We see thus that the negative eﬀect of
social security on saving becomes even more negative or less negative depending on
whether are the intensity of aspirations or of habits that become stronger and also on
the dynamic eﬃciency properties of the economy.
Just to gain some intuition about the eﬀects involved in the analysis, let us consider
the eﬀect of an increase in the value of the habit intensity parameter γ on the multiplier
∂¯ s/∂τ. When the economy is dynamically ineﬃcient (R<n ) a n da ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
social security tax takes place, the present value of lifetime income of the individuals
increases. As individuals exhibit more habits they want to rebalance their consumption
proﬁle and shift adult consumption to the old age. This is achieved through larger
saving and, thus, the negative eﬀect of social security on saving becomes now more
moderate. Similar arguments can be applied to dynamically eﬃcient economies and to
changes in the intensity of aspirations.
We could also extend our analysis to see whether the negative eﬀect of social
security on the coeﬃcient of variation of saving is exacerbated or not by the presence
of aspirations and habits. To see this, we compute the following cross derivatives:
∂2CV (s)
∂τ∂δ















2 (n + Rρ)
1/2 w
> 0.
The crossed derivative ∂2CV (s)/∂τ∂δ has an ambiguous sign if it is evaluated at
δ = γ = τ =0 . However, that derivative can be signed if the strength of the bequest
motive is small. This is why we add the parameter restriction ρ =0when computing
17the crossed derivative. We do not need to impose this additional restriction to sign the
derivative ∂2CV (s)/∂τ∂γ .
We see thus that the negative eﬀect of the introduction of social security on the
dispersion of asset holdings of old individ u a l sb e c o m e sw e a k e rw h e ne i t h e rh a b i t so r
aspirations come into play (under a low value of the altruism factor ρ). Note that in
both cases the endogenous variables will exhibit more inertia as they depend from the
realization of past consumption. This dependence from the initial conditions puts a
limit on the strength of the eﬀects of social security on cross-sectional wealth inequality.
We can analyze now the eﬀects of the introduction of a PAYG social security system
on intergenerational mobility. To this end we compute the derivative of the stationary
value of the autocorrelation coeﬃcient Corr(s0,s) obtained in Section 4 with respect
to the social security tax to obtain
∂Corr(s0,s)
∂τ






(β + ρ)n2 > 0.
The positive sign of this derivative tells us that the introduction of social security
reduces mobility. This is so because the individuals enjoying higher wages are the ones
that get a larger social security beneﬁt when old. Obviously, those individuals will be
the ones that will end up leaving even larger bequests. The converse argument applies to
the individuals earning lower wages. The ﬁnal result is that intergenerational mobility
in wealth decreases when the social security system is introduced. The ﬁrst two panels
of Figure 6 show how the negative eﬀect of social security on intergenerational mobility
is preserved under diﬀerent conﬁgurations of the parameter values of aspiration and
habit intensity under small social security tax rates. However, in these ﬁrst two panels
we see that for large values of the tax rate τ the autocorrelation between assets becomes
negative. This is so because in this case the richer individuals end up saving a negative
amount in spite of leaving a larger amount of bequests, which raises the amount of
saving of their direct descendants. Again, t h ec o n v e r s ea r g u m e n ta p p l i e sf o rt h ep o o r
individuals. In the last two panels of Figure 6, aspirations are present and this pushes
adult consumption up and the average amount of saving becomes negative for all values
of τ. This results in a negative eﬀect of social security on the autocorrelation coeﬃcient
of wealth for all the values of the social security tax.
[Insert Figure 6]
Finally, we can compute
∂2Corr(s0,s)
∂τ∂δ

















2 Rn2 < 0,
to conclude that habits and aspirations tend to decrease the negative eﬀect of
social security on mobility.4 As for the case of intragenerational inequality, the




∂τ∂δ in order to
get a deﬁnite sign.
18introduction of habits and aspirations reduce the eﬃcacy of social security concerning
the intergenerational transmission of wealth since this transmission is relatively more
dependent on the preference parameters δ and γ and less on the policy parameter τ.
7. Conclusion
We have developed a simple model that enable us to study the eﬀect of the introduction
of habits and aspirations on the intragenerational distribution of wealth. Moreover, we
have discussed the interaction of these two phenomena with the redistributive features
of an unfunded social security system. Our results show that the introduction of habits
and aspirations has opposite eﬀects on both the average amount of asset accumulated by
individuals and the level of wealth inequality measured by the coeﬃcient of variation of
wealth. Moreover, the eﬃcacy of the PAYG social security in reducing wealth inequality
becomes weaker when habits and aspirations are present.
Concerning mobility in wealth within the same family, we see that the introduction
of aspirations increases intergenerational mobility as the amount of bequests tend to
be lower. However, the introduction of either habits in preferences or a social security
system result in an increase of the correlation between the amount of assets held by
two members of the same family belonging to consecutive generation since the amount
of bequests left by individuals becomes more correlated with their wealth.
Our model is simple enough to obtain explicit characterizations of other policy
experiments, like the introduction of taxes on capital income or on consumption. The
latter tax is specially relevant since it would aﬀect directly the reference that individuals
take into account when they evaluate their current consumption. Another potential
extension of our model would be the introduction of either idiosyncratic or aggregate
risks aﬀecting the return on saving. This will create a source of volatility in the income
of old individuals which will give raise to precautionary saving. How this saving will
be aﬀected by the presence of habits and aspirations is a topic for future research.
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Figure 1: The eﬀects of δ on the coeﬃcient of variation of wealth CV(s).























Figure 2: The eﬀects of γ on the coeﬃcient of variation of wealth CV(s).
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Figure 3: The eﬀects of δ on the autocorrelation coeﬃcient of wealth Corr(s0,s).




















































Figure 4: The eﬀects of γ on the autocorrelation coeﬃcient of wealth Corr(s0,s).
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Figure 5: The eﬀects of τ on on the coeﬃcient of variation of wealth CV(s).
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Figure 6: The eﬀects of τ on the autocorrelation coeﬃcient of wealth Corr(s0,s).
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